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INITIATION OF RECEIVERSHIP PROCEEDINGS
IN HOUSING CODE ENFORCEMENT
SANFORD E. WOOLt
Although municipal housing and maintenance codes continue to be
enacted in large numbers, especially in response to the requirements
for the federal Workable Program for Community Improvement,1
problems of code enforcement continue to be troublesome. Often the
principal means of enforcement is through criminal prosecution of
landlords, which has many limitations and has usually been found
unsatisfactory. In the search for more effective means of housing code
enforcement, one of the latest remedies to be employed is court ap-
pointment of a receiver of the building. At least six states2 have now
enacted statutes which authorize court appointment of a receiver who
takes over the management of the property, collects the rents, and uses
the rental income to make needed repairs in order to bring the prop-
erty up to the minimum standards of livability as prescribed by the
housing code. After the repairs have been completed and all the ex-
penses incurred have been recouped from the rental income, the
building is then returned to its owner.
Most housing codes are directed toward three aspects of habit-
ability: Structural maintenance of the building, the provision and
maintenance of minimum household facilities, and minimum living
space for building occupants. Since housing codes are ordinarily quite
detailed and do not specify an order of priority among the myriad
violations, a vexing and difficult problem in the administration of
receivership programs is the description of the physical conditions or
the specification of particular code violations which justify the initia-
tion of the proceeding, since the appointment of the receiver lies
within the discretion of the court having jurisdiction. Putting aside
problems of constitutional adequacy in the standards that are pre-
scribed,s the fundamental problem is to describe these conditions in a
way which will avoid the bringing of proceedings for trivial violations,
t Graduate student, Washington University.
1. 42 U.S.C. J 1451(c) (Supp. II, 1966).
2. Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York.
3. In Re Department of Buildings of City of New York, 251 N.Y.S.2d 441,
14 N.Y.2d 291, 200 N.E.2d 432 (1964); Central Savings Bank v. City of New
York, 279 N.Y. 266, 18 N.E.2d 151, 121 A.L.R. 607 (1938).
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partly to eliminate needless suits against owners of substandard build.
ings, and partly to avoid possible constitutional questions should the
statute authorize proceedings for buildings which are not seriously
substandard. Another problem is to dovetail the use of receivership
proceedings with the routine enforcement of the housing code. The
statute ought to be so written that deficiencies reported in the normal
-course of code inspection can furnish the basis for initiating receiver-
ship proceedings.
In an effort to analyze these problems, this note will examine the
statutory basis for the initiation of receivership proceedings under the
state receivership laws presently in force. These laws vary considerably
in stating the basis; some key the receivership action directly to viola-
tions of the housing code, while others attempt an independent defi-
nition of nuisance as the basis for the action. Under both varieties of
law, the statutes differ in the extent to which they require seriously
substandard conditions as the basis of the receivership action.
One of the oldest receivership acts, and certainly the act with the
most judicial interpretation, is in the New York Multiple Dwelling
Law. 4 This act authorizes the appointment of a receiver for the repair
and rehabilitation of multiple dwellings in New York City. The peti-
tioning party is the Commissioner of the Department of Buildings,
and the Commissioner of The Department of Real Estate is appointed
as the receiver if the Court orders an appointment. This statutes au-
thorizes filing of a petition for appointment of a receiver:
Whenever the department shall certify that a nuisance exists in a
multiple dwelling, or any part of its premises, which contitutes a
serious fire hazard or is a serious threat to life, health or safety....
The statute then provides:7
The term "nuisance" shall be held to embrace public nuisance as
known at common law or inequity jurisprudence. Whatever is dan-
gerous to human life or detrimental to health, and whatever
dwelling is over-crowded with occupants or is not provided with
adequate ingress and egress or is not sufficiently supported, venti-
lated, sewered, drained, cleaned, or lighted in reference to its
intented or actual use, and whatever renders the air or human
food or drink unwholesome, are also severally, in contemplation
of this law, nuisances. All such nuisances are unlawful.
4. N.Y. Multiple Dwelling Law § 309 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1 (e).
7. Id. at I(a).
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This statute contains several ambiguities. While the reference is to
a nuisance "at common law or equity," the statute fails to recognize
that the common law described different degrees of nuisance, depend-
ing upon the relief that was granted for correction of the substandard
conditions. For drastic remedies, a higher degree of nuisance was
required. For example, more serious deficiencies were required if the
remedy was demolition, without compensation, as compared to abate-
ment through correction.8 Presumably, conditions warranting the
appointment of a receiver would not need to be as serious as the con-
ditions warranting demolition of the structure, but the statute makes
no such distinction.
Apart from difficulties in determining what combination of con-
ditions will justify the petition for a receivership, the statute also pre-
sents difficulties in coordinating the nuisance requirement with the
multiple dwelling code as grounds for a petition. Thus, it is not clear
when lack of ventilation, as specified by the code, will constitute in-
adequate ventilation sufficient to constitute a statutory nuisance under
the law. The same point can be made about the other substandard
conditions described by the statute. While the nuisance must consti-
tute a "serious" threat, no basis is provided for determining when such
a threat exists.
The Connecticut statute is quite similar to New York's in that it
employs a definition of nuisance to justify the receivership action. It
provides:9
Whenever any order issued under (statute cited) . . . or under
the provisions of any municipal charter or special act or ordi-
nance relating to the abatement of nuisances in tenement houses
is not complied with ... the authority appointed ... shall apply
... for a rule requiring the owner or any mortgagees or lienors of
record to show cause why the chief executive of such municipality
... should not be appointed receiver of the rents, issues and prof-
its of such property . . .
The statute further provides that a petition for appointment of a
receiver shall contain:10
A statement that a nuisance which constitutes a serious fire
hazard or is a serious threat to life, health or safety continued to
exist in such property after the time fixed for the removal thereof
in such order . . .
8. 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 18(a), § 118(a) (1950).
9. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19-347b (Supp. 1965).
10. Id.
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The statute authorizing abatement of nuisances provides as follows:"l
Whenever any tenement, lodging or boarding house, or any
building, structure, excavation, business pursuit, matter or thing
in or about such house or the lot on which it is situated, or the
plumbing, sewerage, drainage, lighting or ventilation of such
house, is, in the opinion of the board of health, in a condition
which is or in its effect is dangerous or detrimental to life or
health, such board may declare that the same, to the extent speci-
fied by such board, is a public nuisance, and may order the same
to be removed, abated, suspended, altered or otherwise improved
or purified, as the order specifies ...
This statute links the initiation of receivership actions to an in-
dependent public determination that a building constitutes a public
nuisance, and unlike the New York law, does not attempt to enlarge
on the character of a public nuisance through independent statutory
definition. Furthermore, the law by implication would allow the ap-
pointment of a receiver when conditions exist short of deficiencies
which would allow demolition, since a petition for a receiver may
apparently follow the failure to abide by an order for correction or
abatement of a substandard building condition.
A more comprehensive definition of the basis for a receivership
petition is found in the recently-enacted Indiana statute: 12
Whenever the commissioner of buildings . . . shall find therein
any building or structure, or any part thereof, no matter for what
purpose designed or used, or anything that is appurtenant
thereto, to be in such impaired structural condition or state, aris-
ing from any cause or reason whatever, which renders it unsafe or
dangerous either to any person or any property; or be so unsani-
tary, or so infested with disease, as to cause or threaten a serious
hazard to public health, or to the general welfare in that locality;
or to be so used, or in such condition, that thereby a dangerous fire
hazard or other danger to life or property, is created or allowed
to continue, or may reasonably result therefrom; or to be so con-
structed, maintained, or used as to result in the violation of any
statute, ordinance, or regulations authorized by law and relevant
thereto, or so as to constitute or be about to become a public nui-
sance . . .
This statute does not limit the grounds for the petition to a finding
of public nuisance, and for the first time introduces a violation of a
statute or ordinance, presumably only those requiring building main-
11. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19-344 (1958).
12. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 48-6144 (Burns 1963).
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tenance, as the basis for the receivership petition. However, while the
nonstatutory conditions must be "dangerous" or "unsafe," apparently
any violation of a statute or ordinance can furnish the basis for a
receivership petition. Note also that a petition may be brought when
there is a "serious hazard ... to the general welfare of the locality."
As the term "general welfare" is undefined, presumably the statutory
language would permit receivership actions based on blighting in-
fluences which are not necessarily structural. For example, an unkempt
and vacant building in an otherwise standard neighborhood might
conceivably endanger the "general welfare" of the community, even
though the building itself is not structurally unsound.
The Massachusetts law also bases the receivership action on viola-
tions of code standards, but does not permit the action to be brought
for trivial violations: 13
Any tenant who rents space in a building for residential purposes
wherein a condition exists which is in violation of the standards
of fitness for human habitation established under the state sani-
tary code or in violation of any board of health standards, which
condition may endanger or materially impair his health or well-
being or the health or well-being of the public, may file a peti-
tion against the owner of said building...
This statute does not attempt a description of those code violations
which will "materially impair" the well-being of the occupant, and
also places the responsibility for initiating proceedings on the tenant
rather than on the public official charged with code enforcement.
Variants of the Massachusetts law, enacted in Illinois and New Jer-
sey, shift the responsibility for initiating proceedings to the appropri-
ate public officer, but apparently would allow proceedings for any
code violation. Note that the Illinois law is explicit in requiring an
official finding that a violation exists before a receivership proceeding
may be instituted. This statutory approach seems preferable to stat-
utes, like some of those quoted, which describe the conditions under
which the receivership action may be brought without requiring some
form of official participation in the decision leading up to initiation of
the proceedings. Those statutes not requiring official participation
seem particularly vulnerable to abuse when the action can be initiated
by the tenant. The Illinois provision is as follows:'4
13. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 111, j 127h (Supp. 1966).
14. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 24, § 11-31-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966).
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If the appropriate official of any municipality determines, upon
due investigation, that any building or structure therein fails to
conform to the minimum standards of health and safety as set
forth in the applicable ordinances of such municipality . . the
municipality may make application to any court of competent
jurisdiction for an injunction requiring compliance .. .or for
such other order as the court may deem necessary or appropriate
to secure such compliance.
The New Jersey law provides: 15
Upon the adoption of an ordinance pursuant to this act and in
the event that any owner of a building or structure in the munici-
pality shall violate such ordinance or fail to abate a condition
harmful to the health and safety of the occupants of the build-
ing or structure and the general public in the municipality
municipal officer .. .may, by and with the approval of the gov-
erning body of such municipality, bring an action ... to be ap-
pointed receiver ex officio of the rents and income . . .for the
purpose of abating said conditions.
A review of the receivership statutes enacted so far has indicated
that the statutory draftsmen have not given sufficient consideiation
to the basis for initiating the receivership action. Some of these laws
confer considerable discretion upon the enforcing agency, and would
permit the institution of receivership actions for building conditions
which do not constitute serious or substantial violations of mainte-
nance codes. While no one formula can be offered as a pattern for
future legislation, the following criteria would seem essential:
1. Initiation of the receivership action should explicitly be keyed
to violations of the housing or maintenance code. While it may not
be possible to improve on language calling for "serious" violations,
or violations which "materially impair" the' well-being of the occu-
pants, some improvement in language might be attempted. At the
outset, a distinction might be drawn between building conditions
which warrant demolition without compensation, and conditions
which are considered repairable. In addition, the statutory focus
might be shifted from an emphasis on the impact on building occu-
pants, or on the general public, to an emphasis on the extent to which
the code standards are violated. For example, receivership actions
could be authorized for buildings which are so structurally substan-
dard that they warrant substantial repairs requiring major capital in-
vestment. An alternative ground would authorize initiation of pro-
15. N.J.S.A. § 40:48-2.12h (Supp. 1965).
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ceedings when buildings are deficient in essential household facilities,
which would then be enumerated. Continued use of the "public
nuisance" standard would seem undesirable in view of the vagueness
of nuisance criteria and the difficulty of relating such criteria to vio-
lations of the code.
2. While tenant-initiated actions may be warranted in some in-
stances, ordinarily the initiation of the receivership action should fol-
low explicit findings by the enforcing agency that the building has
been inspected, that violations have been found, that they have not
been corrected, and that a receivership proceeding is necessary to
remedy these conditions and to carry out the purpose of the code.
With such a provision the use of the receivership remedy could be
more carefully coordinated with more ordinary proceedings for en-
forcement of the housing and maintenance codes.
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